Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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DRAFT REPORT OF MAIN COMMITTEE I

Addendum

Report of Working Group 1

I. Review of Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty [and the régime of non-proliferation it supports] play a [central] role in promoting regional and international peace and security. The Conference therefore welcomes the accession of further Parties to the NPT since the last Review Conference and urges all States not Party to the Treaty to accede to it. The Conference remains convinced that full compliance of all Parties to and universal adherence with the Treaty are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States.

2. The Conference also reaffirms its determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices [to additional States], without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the Treaty. Such proliferation would add immeasurably to regional and international tensions. It would increase the risk of nuclear war and lessen the security of all States.

3. The Conference reiterates the concerns and reaffirms the convictions expressed in preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 and agrees they remain valid. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Conference expresses the expectation that this tendency, contributing to lessening the danger of nuclear war, will be strengthened and become worldwide. The States Parties to the Treaty agree that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never

be fought, in order to avoid the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. They remain convinced that any proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.

4. The Conference agrees that the strict observance of the terms of Articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security, including to the peace and security of non-Parties.

5. The Conference acknowledges the declarations by nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under Article I. The Conference further acknowledges the declarations that non-nuclear weapons States Party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under Article II. The Conference underlines the vital need for all Parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their obligations [and to avoid any actions or statements which could raise questions about their compliance, and thereby undermine the confidence of other States Party to the Treaty in the security offered by their commitment to the Treaty.]

6. The Conference notes with satisfaction the joint declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (document NPT/CONF.IV/28) by which they reaffirm their contractual and unilateral undertaking not to manufacture, possess or have control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and by which they declare that the united Germany, too, will abide by this obligation, that rights and obligations under the instruments of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will continue to apply to the united Germany, and that the united Germany will seek the continued validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995 and that it supports the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

7. The Conference expresses deep concern that the national nuclear programmes of some States non-Party to the Treaty may lead them to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. The Conference affirms the determination to stop the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities, and hence the ability to develop and produce nuclear weapons. [The Conference therefore underlines the need for all States Parties to continue to make every effort to ensure the effective (and uniform) implementation of export controls on items possibly destined for use in such nuclear programmes, in a manner which avoids hampering legitimate peaceful nuclear programmes of States Party to the Treaty.

States Party to the Treaty reiterate that any further detonation of a nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclear-weapon State would constitute a most serious breach of the non-proliferation objective.]

8. [The Conference expressed great and serious concerns about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel. In this connection, the Conference calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel.] 1/

9. [The Conference also notes concerns expressed about the failure of a number of States with nuclear programmes in different/other regions of the world to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to make binding international commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. In this connection the Conference reiterates its belief that accession to the NPT has a fundamental role to play in strengthening mutual confidence and the security of States.] 2/

1/ Some delegations expressed the view that there should be no mentioning of specific countries in this section of the report. The same delegations could accept naming of countries provided this was done in a comprehensive manner as outlined in the proposed text attached. (See Annex I). Other delegations expressed disagreement with this view. An alternative text proposal for para. 9 of Annex I is also attached. (See Annex II).

2/ Some delegations would prefer that the proposed para. 9 replace para. 8. In that case the word "different" should be used in the second line. Alternatively, the paragraph could be added to the present para. 8, in which case the word "other" should be used.

Annex I

Proposed text by the United Kingdom

8. The Conference expresses particular concern about the nuclear capabilities of Israel, and expresses its condemnation of any attempt to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The Conference also notes the calls on all States for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources and devices to Israel.

9. The Conference also expresses concern about the nuclear capabilities of South Africa. At the same time it recalls the constructive part that South Africa played in establishing the IAEA and welcomes the President's statement on 21 September 1987 that South Africa "hopes that it will soon be able to sign the NPT and has decided to open discussions with others to this end". The Conference urges South Africa to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible opportunity.

10. The Conference also notes the concerns about the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan. It welcomes the agreement between the two countries not to attack one another's nuclear facilities and urges both countries to bring the agreement into force and to seek further ways of enhancing mutual confidence. In this connection the Conference reiterates its belief that accession to the NPT has a fundamental role to play in strengthening mutual confidence and the security of States.

11. The Conference also notes that there are unsafeguarded nuclear activities in both Argentina and Brazil. It welcomes the declarations made by the two States on nuclear matters and the extensive programme of contacts and visits between them. In the interests of world peace and security it urges both countries to consolidate these confidence-building measures by bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force for their two countries and by acceding to the NPT.

Annex II

Articles I and II, preambular paragraphs 1-3

Proposed text by Nigeria

The Conference expresses great and serious concern about the nuclear weapons capability of South Africa. The Conference is alarmed by the assistance rendered to South Africa in the pursuit of its nuclear weapons capability through the supply and provision of sensitive equipment, materials, technology, information and training facilities among others, by some nuclear-suppliers NPT States Parties. The Conference acknowledges that this assistance has greatly increased the capability of South Africa which is not party to the NPT, to produce nuclear weapons with far-reaching consequences for international peace and security and in violation of Article I of the NPT. The Conference underlines the particularly grave threats posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of the South African apartheid régime in the region and the consequences of this development for the peace and stability of other States in Africa.

In this connection, the Conference calls for the total, complete, and immediate prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities resources or devices to South Africa.